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Choosing a Medicare Part D Plan:   
Are Medicare Beneficiaries Choosing Low-Cost Plans? 
 
 
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173), the legislation that added the Part D 
prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program, represents the single most significant 
expansion of a public insurance programs in the U.S. in the past 40 years.  A key, and 
controversial, feature of this legislation was the use of multiple private insurance providers to 
deliver this new public insurance product.  Under the Part D program, dozens of private insurers 
offer a wide range of drug plans with varying prices and benefit design features.  This represents 
a departure from the traditional model of government-mandated uniform benefits and fee-for-
service reimbursement for other Medicare-covered benefits. 
 
This unprecedented privatization of the delivery of a public insurance product raises a host of 
important policy questions.  A key question is whether Medicare beneficiaries are making 
economically optimal decisions about which plan to enroll in, based on their expected premiums 
and out-of-pocket costs for the prescription drugs they take.  While other factors could be 
important to beneficiaries in choosing a Part D plan, such as the reputation of the insurance 
company or the extent to which the plan restricts access to medications, 72 percent of seniors 
reported that the amount the plan charges for each prescription was a very important factor in 
deciding upon which drug plan to enroll in.1  This issue brief explores the financial implications 
of actual Part D plan choices made by Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D plans in 2006, 
the first year of the program’s operation. 
 
 
Background 
 
The Medicare Part D benefit is delivered through two types of private plans: stand-alone 
prescription drugs plans (PDPs) for beneficiaries who wish to remain in traditional fee-for-
service Medicare, or Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug (MA-PD) plans, such as HMOs, 
PPOs, or private fee-for-service plans, which provide all Medicare benefits, including 
prescription drugs.  Despite initial uncertainty about whether insurance companies would be 
willing to participate in the new Part D drug plan market, the industry response has far exceeded 
expectations.  In 2006, there were a total of 1,429 stand-alone PDPs offered throughout the 
nation, with about 40 PDPs available in most states.  The number of PDPs increased by about 30 
percent in 2007, from 1,429 plans to 1,875 plans, remained at this level in 2008, and was 
somewhat lower in 2009.2   The majority of PDPs are offered by a dozen national or near-
national companies.  In addition, there were 1,333 MA-PD plans available throughout the U.S. in 
2006, and the number of MA-PD plans has also increased over time.3  By November 2006, every 
county in the nation had at least 27 plans available and the typical county had 48 plans, while 
some counties featured more than 70 choices, primarily due to a high number of MA plans.4  
 
With the proliferation of private plan choices under Medicare Part D, government officials and 
other proponents of the market-based approach used to deliver the Medicare drug benefit 
suggested that beneficiaries would have an opportunity to choose among competing plans to 
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identify the specific plan that would best meet their needs, based on each individual’s 
prescription drug regimen.  Medicare created a web-based tool that allows beneficiaries to input 
detailed information about their drug regimen, including specific drug, dose level and frequency, 
and other preferences, such as pharmacy location, to narrow down the list of drug plans available 
in their area (both PDPs and MA-PD plans) and identify the best plan according to their total 
expected costs of enrolling, including monthly premiums and prescription drug cost-sharing 
amounts.5 
 
As of June 2006, after the first open enrollment period for Part D, a total of 22.5 million 
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in Part D plans, including 10.4 million people who chose to 
enroll in stand-alone PDPs, 6.0 million people who enrolled in MA-PD plans, and 6.1 million 
dual eligibles (beneficiaries eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid) who were automatically 
enrolled in stand-alone PDPs.6,7  Although voluntary enrollment in Part D plans was greater than 
many anticipated for the new public program, survey results indicated that many beneficiaries 
were confused by their enrollment options.  Nearly three-fourths (73 percent) of people ages 65 
and older felt that the Medicare prescription drug benefit was too complicated, along with 91 
percent of pharmacists and 92 percent of doctors.8  When asked if they agree with the statement: 
“Medicare should select a handful of plans that meet certain standards so seniors have an easier 
time choosing,” 60 percent of seniors answered in the affirmative.9   
 
 
Data for This Analysis 
 
The primary data source for this analysis is a longitudinal sample of prescription drug records 
from the Wolters Kluwer (WK) company.  WK is the largest “switch” operator in the 
prescription drug market, collecting electronic claims from retail pharmacies and passing them 
on to pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and insurance companies that pay the claims.  After 
claims are adjudicated, they are passed back through the “switch” to the pharmacy.  WK 
performs this function for a large sample of retail pharmacies throughout the U.S.10  On average 
the claims captured by the WK system represent almost 31 percent of all third-party prescription 
claims filled in the U.S.11  The geographic distribution of these data is very closely representative 
of the geographic distribution of third-party claims as well; the correlation between the WK 
market share and the overall third-party market share across each of the states is 0.86.  The WK 
dataset excludes Part D claims filled by beneficiaries in a subset of Medicare Advantage plans 
that operate their own retail pharmacies, prescription filled through mail order, and prescriptions 
filled in institutions. 
 
WK maintains a longitudinal database that tracks prescription drug use for more than 100 million 
people in the U.S.  For this analysis, WK provided a longitudinal sample of prescription claims 
for individuals ages 65 and over in 2005, excluding Medicare beneficiaries who are under age 65 
(roughly seven million beneficiaries).  The data cover the 24-month period from January 2005 
through December 2006.  This dataset is valuable for research because it contains information 
both on specific drug utilization by seniors in Part D plans and that can be used to identify plan 
enrollment.  Information about specific drug utilization is critical because plan costs vary 
tremendously based on drug utilization, as discussed below.   
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The other major source of data for this analysis is information on the availability of Part D plans 
and specific plan features directly from four files provided by CMS: the plan information file, the 
beneficiary cost file, the formulary file and the geographic locator file.  The plan information file 
lists plan names and identifiers, and regions/counties in which plans are offered.  The beneficiary 
cost file contains copayments and coinsurance rates for different tiers of each plan.  The 
formulary file contains a list of all the drugs that are included on the formulary for each plan.  
The geographic locator file was used to identify all of the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
counties that correspond to different PDP and MA regions.  
  
The final sample for the analysis includes 55,000 individuals who had a Part D claim in 2006, 
were enrolled in a stand-alone PDP, were not employer-insured, dual eligibles, or eligible for 
Part D low-income subsidies/partial subsidies, were in the dataset for both 2005 and 2006, and 
were able to be matched to a specific PDP in the CMS plan information file.12  The WK data 
report each patient’s county and the name of the company that provides the Part D plan that is 
covering each prescription, but not specifically which Part D plan offered by that company is 
covering the prescription.  For this analysis, beneficiaries were matched to specific PDPs using a 
combination of county code, company name, and copayment structure.  Beneficiaries receiving 
Part D low-income subsidies were excluded from this analysis because they are not required to 
pay the full premium or cost-sharing requirements and typically do not choose a Part D plan on 
their own because they are assigned to a plan by the government. 
 
 
Modeling Plan Choice 
 
I estimate for each Medicare beneficiary in the WK dataset the cost of enrolling in each PDP 
available to them in their particular state.  I do so by replicating the plan calculator available on 
the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder website, which takes as inputs specific prescription 
drug names and amounts, and outputs the out-of-pocket costs to the enrollee of enrolling in each 
plan in their option set.  The total cost includes both premium costs and expected out-of-pocket 
costs for prescriptions, obtained by running a measure of the individual’s prescription drug use 
(described below) through the plan calculator for each plan available to them.  I then assess the 
actual choices made by individuals relative to this opportunity set.   
 
This analysis is designed to answer the question:  Do seniors choose the PDP which has the 
lowest costs (both premiums and out-of-pocket drug costs) among the PDPs that are available in 
their state?  The analysis does not account for other reasons why enrollees might choose higher-
cost plans, such as brand preference or plan quality differences.    
 
 
Models of Expectations 
 
A key issue for modeling whether individuals are choosing the lowest-cost plan available to them 
is assessing their expectations for their prescription drug use in the coming year.  Without 
knowing how individuals form those expectations, this analysis considers two different models 
and assesses the robustness of the findings to their chosen plan.  The two models are: 
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y Model 1: Backwards-Looking: Assume that individuals expect to use the same 
prescriptions in 2006 that they used in 2005, and model plan choice using 2005 
prescriptions.  This approximates the rationale behind the Medicare plan finder tool, 
where the user can enter in the medications they are currently taking in order to compare 
the total cost to them of plans offered in their area. 
 
y Model 2: Perfect Foresight: Assume that individuals know when they choose a Part 
D plan for 2006 exactly what drugs they will use throughout the year in 2006, and 
model plan choice using 2006 prescriptions. 
 
 
Results 
 
Regardless of which model of expectations is used to assess plan choice, this analysis suggests 
that remarkably few Part D enrollees in the WK dataset chose the lowest-cost stand-alone PDP 
available to them in 2006.  Table 1 presents the findings from which this conclusion is drawn, 
including the percent of enrollees choosing the lowest-cost plan under each model of 
expectations and the foregone monetary amount (expressed both in dollars and as a percent of 
actual spending) that results from choosing a higher-cost plan (at the mean and 95th percentile).   
 
The three columns in the table correspond to the backwards-looking model, the perfect foresight 
model, and a “best match” model, which assumes that individuals employ whichever model of 
expectations leads to the best match with their chosen plan.  That is, evaluating the lowest-cost 
plan under each model of expectations, if the individual’s chosen plan matches the lowest-cost 
plan under either model, the “best match” model would indicate that the lowest-cost plan was 
indeed chosen. 
 
The table of results is divided into four panels from top to bottom.  The first panel examines the 
propensity of beneficiaries to choose the one lowest-cost plan available to them in their state 
under each of the three models of expectations.   
y In 2006, between 6 percent and 9 percent of seniors chose the lowest-cost plan.   
y Among those who did not choose the lowest-cost plan, enrollees would have saved 
between $360 and $520 on average if they had chosen the lowest-cost plan, based on 
their actual prescription drug use in 2006.   
y At the 95th percentile, savings would have been as much as $1,360 – that is, using the 
backwards-looking model of expectations, 5 percent of Part D enrollees in this analysis 
could have saved $1,360 or more by choosing the lowest-cost plan.   
y Under the “best match” model, enrollees who did not choose the lowest-cost plan would 
have saved an average of 30 percent if they had chosen the lowest-cost plan, and 5 
percent of enrollees would have saved 58 percent or more. 
 
Reading down the table, the next three panels model looser definitions of “lowest cost.”  The 
second panel examines the propensity of beneficiaries to choose one of the plans that is among 
the 5 percent with lowest costs.  That is, in a state with 40 PDPs, choosing among the 5 percent 
with the lowest costs would mean choosing either one of the two lowest-cost plans.   
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y Results show that that 10 percent to 13 percent of seniors chose one of the lowest-cost 5 
percent of PDPs available in their state, and savings among those who did not choose 
from among this lowest-cost set of plans would have been considerable.   
y For example, using the perfect foresight model of expectations, enrollees who did not 
choose one of the lowest-cost plans would have saved $350 (or 28 percent of their actual 
spending in 2006) by choosing a plan in the lowest 5 percent of total costs. 
 
The third panel presents an even more expansive definition: choosing a plan in the lowest 25 
percent of plan costs.  That is, in a state with 40 PDPs available, the lowest-cost 25 percent of 
plans would amount to 10 plans.   
y Results show that roughly half of enrollees chose plans in the lowest 25 percent of total 
costs in 2006, and that even relative to this loose standard of “lowest cost”, the savings 
that would have been achieved from choosing one of the lowest-cost plans are non-trivial. 
 
The fourth panel models enrollment choices where the target is choosing from among plans in 
the lowest 50 percent of the total cost distribution.   
y Even using this very expansive definition of lowest cost, between 14.1 percent and 24.7 
percent of individuals did not choose one of the lowest-cost plans, depending upon which 
model of expectations is assumed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The unprecedented privatization of a public insurance function embedded in the Medicare Part D 
program provides an excellent opportunity to understand how well individuals handle choice in 
their public insurance options.  The results presented here suggest that the answer is “not very 
well” in terms of maximizing savings to the consumer; most seniors in this analysis did not 
choose the lowest-cost Part D plan available to them in 2006.   
 
It is important to acknowledge that there could be factors other than savings that drive Part D 
plan enrollment decisions.  Some beneficiaries may choose to pay more for a plan with a strong 
brand name or a good reputation.  Others may be willing to pay more for a plan that has fewer 
utilization restrictions, such as prior authorization requirements or step therapy limits.  And some 
beneficiaries may choose to pay more for a plan that contracts with a convenient pharmacy that 
is not in the network of the lowest-cost plan.  A detailed analysis that controls for these other 
factors substantiates the fundamental conclusion of the present analysis:  many Part D enrollees 
are not financially optimizing in their choice of a Medicare drug plan. 13 
 
The findings of this analysis suggest that choice across such a wide range of Part D plan options 
may not be in the best interest of beneficiaries who are looking to maximize their savings.  
Future research may want to consider the long-term costs for seniors, who tend to stick with their 
Part D plan from year to year rather than assess alternatives that might better meet their 
prescription drug needs. 
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Table 1:  Modeling Enrollment in Lowest-Cost Stand-Alone Prescription Drug Plans and 
Foregone Monetary Amounts Associated with Plan Choices in 2006 
 Backwards-Looking Model: 
Using 2005 Prescriptions to 
Assess 2006 Plan Choice 
Perfect Foresight Model: 
Using 2006 Prescriptions to 
Assess 2006 Plan Choice 
Best 
Match 
Model 
Choice of Lowest-Cost PDP 
Percent Choosing 6% 7% 9% 
Foregone Amount 
In Dollars: 
Mean 
95th  Percentile 
 
 
$520 
$1,360 
 
 
$470 
$1,190 
 
 
$360 
$870 
As a % of  Actual 
Spending:  
Mean 
95th Percentile  
 
 
46% 
99% 
 
 
37% 
64% 
 
 
30% 
58% 
Choice of Lowest-Cost 5 Percent of PDPs 
Percent Choosing 10% 11% 13% 
Foregone Amount 
In Dollars: 
Mean 
95th  Percentile 
 
 
$400 
$1,050 
 
 
$350 
$880 
 
 
$280 
$720 
As a % of  Actual 
Spending:  
Mean 
95th Percentile  
 
 
35% 
82% 
 
 
28% 
54% 
 
 
24% 
50% 
Choice of Lowest-Cost 25 Percent of PDPs 
Percent Choosing 53% 49% 64% 
Foregone Amount 
In Dollars: 
Mean 
95th  Percentile 
 
 
$220 
$640 
 
 
$180 
$510 
 
 
$150 
$450 
As a % of  Actual 
Spending:  
Mean 
95th Percentile  
 
 
18% 
50% 
 
 
13% 
33% 
 
 
11% 
31% 
Choice of Lowest-Cost 50 Percent of PDPs 
Percent Choosing 78% 75% 86% 
Foregone Amount 
In Dollars: 
Mean 
95th  Percentile 
 
 
$190 
$580 
 
 
$150 
$450 
 
 
$140 
$410 
As a % of  Actual 
Spending:  
Mean 
95th Percentile  
 
 
15% 
43% 
 
 
10% 
28% 
 
 
9% 
26% 
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Wolters Kluwer prescription drug claims data, 2005-2006, for the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2009. 
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